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be sustained because of failure to comply with a mandatory provision of
the statutes as to selection. (2) Or it might be overruled without violating
any legal principles, unless actual harm had been inflicted by the irregu-
larity. Possibly the law would seem less peremptory if actual harm was the
primary consideration. But for convenience of application and as a more
stringent guardian of the right to a trial fair in all respects, the practice
of invalidating panels drawn with a disregard of material provisions of the
statute (upon timely plea), even though it does not affirmatively appear that
any harm has ensued, is to be commended. However,. it is further submitted,
that if the case has been decided on its merits by a jury composed of indi-
vidually competent persons-persons not subject to challenge for cause, the
ruling in the principal case should not be the basis of reversible error. To
so consider this ruling on the challange to the array, is to modify the
generally accepted rules of Indiana Practice that reversible error be harmful
error.
2 5  H. A. A.
CONIrroNAL LAW-PRIMLEGES AND IMMUNrrIES CLAUSE OF THE FOaU-
TEENTH AMENDMENT.-The Vermont Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1931
imposed an individual income tax of 4 per cent. on income received on account
of ownership or use of, or interest in, any interest bearing security, denom-
inated class B income. Excluded from this tax, however, were: (a) cor-
porate dividends earned within the state; (b) interest received on account of
money loaned within the state at a rate of interest not exceeding 5 per cent.
per annum. Held, that exempting from the tax income from dividends earned
within the state did not deny equal protection of the laws, but, that exempting
from the tax income from money loaned within the state at not more than 5
per cent. interest, apart from the equality clause, violated the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
since the classification was based on a difference having no substantial rela-
tion to the revenue objective of the act.1
There would seem to be no legitimate objection on reason or authority to
the court upholding the first exemption, referred to above, as not being in
violation of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 However,
25 Morris v. State (1883), 94 Ind. 565, Hicks v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 401,
156 N. E. 548 (voir dire in court's discretion unless harm shown), Terre
Haute Electric Co. v. Watson (1904), 33 Ind. App. 124, 70 N.E. 993 (Over-
ruling of challenge for cause not reversible error unless peremptory chal-
lenges exhausted so as to constitute harm).
1 Colgate v. Harvey (1935), 56 S. Ct. 252.
2 Another Vermont tax act imposed a tax of 2 per cent. upon the net
income of every corporation for the privilege of exercising its franchise in
the state and of doing business therein. In addition to the 2 per cent. fran-
chise tax, all tangible corporate property lying within the state is subject
to a property tax. As the court points out, the 2 per cent. franchise tax,
especially with the property tax added, has the effect of indirectly imposing
a tax burden upon domestic business measurably equivalent to the 4 per cent.
tax burden imposed upon dividends realized from out-of-state business. Fur-
thermore, since the 4 per cent. tax is imposed only upon such part of the
corporate net income as passes to the shareholders in the form of dividends,
and the 2 per cent. tax is measured by the entire net income of the corpora-
tion, it may well be that the one tax burden would approximate the other.
It seems clear, therefore, that the classification relative to dividends is not
arbitrary. It has always been the doctrine of the Supreme Court that, though
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the exemption relative to money loaned within the state raises a closer ques-
tion under the equality clause and apparently also a question under the United
States privileges and immunities clause.
In considering the exemption relative to loans made at not more than 5
per cent. within the state the majority opinion first considered the application
of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court announced,
"We are unable to find in the provision any public purpose which can be
subserved by making the taxation of income from loans dependent merely
upon the adventitious circumstance as to the place of making the loan." There
being no specifically named public purpose supporting this exemption, the court
refused to find one other than the obvious but incomplete purpose of revenue,
and, therefore, thought it dubious whether or not there was a sufficient basis
for this classification.
It is settled law that in passing upon the constitutionality of a tax, if it
appears or may fairly be assumed that the tax is for the purpose of promoting
a permissible public aim, it cannot be condemned because one class must pay
the tax while another does not. So long as the classification reasonably sub-
serves such permissible public aim it is due process of law.3 In fact there
must be a clear indication that the purpose is a hostile or oppressive discrimna-
tion against particular persons ot classes before a tax will be pronounced
invalid.4 In the instant case there was no serious contention, as pointed out
in the minority opinion, of a hostile or oppressive purpose in the exemption
in question. However, the obvious answer to the majority view is the ap-
parent purpose of the Legislature to encourage by this exemption loans at a
favorable rate of interest within the state.5 Since the exemption is not clearly
the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids class legislation, it
does not forbid classification. Calculated to avoid multiple taxation, the
classification is reasonable and is, therefore, due process of law.
See Kidd v. Alabama (1902), 188 U. S. 730, 23 S. Ct. 401, Darnell v.
Indiana (1912), 226 U. S. 390, 33 S. Ct. 120; Travelers' Insurance Co. v.
-Connecticut (1902), 185 U. S. 364, 22 S. Ct. 673, Watson v. State Comptroller
(1920), 254 U. S. 122, 41 S. Ct. 43, Lawrence v. State Tax Comm. (1932),
286 U. S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556.
With this position, taken by the majority of the court, the minority in its
opinion has no quarrel.
3American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana (1900), 179 U. S. 89, 21 S. Ct.
43, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. (1922), 260 U. S. 245, 43 S. Ct. 83, Aero
Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm. (1935), 295 U. S.
285, 55 S. Ct. 709; Magnano Co. v. Hamilton (1934), 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. Ct.
599; Fox v. Standard Oil Co. (1935), 294 U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333.
4 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana (1900), 179 U. S. 89, 21 S. Ct.
43, Board of Education v. Illinois (1906), 203 U. S. 553, 27 S. Ct. 171,
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm. (1932), 286 U. S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556, Concordia
Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois (1934), 292 U. S. 535, '54 S. Ct. 830.
5 As put in the minority opinion, " it can hardly be said for
that reason to be contravening a Constitution that has known a protective
tariff for more than 100 years."
When the exemption of income from loans made within the state was
adopted the Legislature had before it the reports of two committees which
indicated that the existing system was driving investment capital from the
state of Vermont or into secured and non-commercial loans; and that a tax
exemption embracing both secured and commercial loans would tend to increase
the supply of investment capital for both snd to reduce interest rates in
Vermont.
The minority opinion recalls to attention the "salutory principle of decision,
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invidious, but rather is clearly adapted to a legitimate purpose, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution should have no application.
The court in the instant case, however, did not prefer to assign its decision
to the equality clause, but, as indicated above, rested it on the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6  Said the court, "But
assuming that the state of Vermont is benefited by the exemption, the com-
plete answer is that appellant is a citizen of the United States; and, quite
apart from the equal protection of the laws clause, the suggestion is effectively
met and overcome, and the fallacy of other attempts-to sustain the validity
of the exemption here under review clearly demonstrated, by reference to the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourtenth Amendment."
Herein the court reversed a policy which had continued from the time of
the Slaughter House Cases of 1873.7 Though that case was a five to four
decision, it has remained the law, and the Supreme Court has confined the
scope of the United States privileges and immunities clause to the protection
of only those interests which grow out of the relationship between the citizen
and the national government. 8 The peculiar privileges incident to United
States citizenship are few in number. Among them may be named access
to the seat of government and to the seaports, protection on the high seas,
peaceable assemblage, petitioning the government for redress, the writ of
habeas corpus, use of navigable waters, state citizenship by residence, the
immunity from slavery, and the right to due process.9 Furthermore, as ob-
served in the minority opinion, the privileges and immunities clause "created
no new privileges and immunities of United States citizenship,lO and as
they are derived exclusively from the Constitution and laws enacted under it,
the states were powerless to abridge them before the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment as well as after."1 1
The court's reluctance1 2 to enlarge the scope of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause has been well understood since the Slaughter House Cases in which
the issue was fought out. If extended so as to more than duplicate the pro-
tection of liberty and property secured to persons and citizens by the other
provisions of the Constitution, it would enlarge judicial control of state action
to an extent sufficient to cause serious apprehension for the rightful inde-
pendence of local government.
The majority of the court in the principal case seemingly restrict the
application of the privileges and immunities clause to those inequalities in
that, out of decent respect to an independent branch of the government,
legislative acts must be taken to be based on facts which support their
constitutional validity unless the contrary reasonably appears."
6 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
716 Wall. 36.
8 Hugh E. Willis (1936), "Constitutional Law of the United States," p.
927
9 Slaughter-House Cases (1873), 16 Wall. 56, Crandall v. Nevada (1867),
6 Wall. 35. Hugn E. Willis (1936), "Constitutional Law of the United
States," p. 192.
10 Bartmever v. Iowa- (1873), 18 Wall. 129, 133.
11 See Crandall v. Nevada (1867), 6 Wall. 35.
12 Forty-four cases have been appealed to the Supreme Court in which
state statutes have been assailed as infringements of the privileges and im-
munities clause. Until the instant case no-decision held that state legislation
infringed that clause.
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taxation which are considered to be arbitrary and unreasonable. If this is so,
it is difficult to understand why the exemption in question does not clearly
merit condemnation as a denial of the equal protection clause, which extends
to all "persons" including citizens of the United States, and "nothing can be
added to the vehemence of the denunciation Ly invoking the command of the
privileges and immunities clause."
If on the other hand the privileges and immunities clause may be invoked
against even reasonable classification, then the door is completely open to the
literal protection of both the fundamental rights, powers, privileges and
immunities of the Bill of Rights, 1 3 and all the fundamental rights, powers,
privileges and immunities of the common law. Thus a protection would be
accorded the privileges and immunities clause and those privileges and im-
munities selected by the court, in excess of that which has been deemed
needful or desirable for the protection of the contract clause, the commerce
clause, and the due process clause. This is substantially the position taken
by Mr. Justice Stone in the dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brandeis
and Mr. Justice Cardozo concurred.
It is submitted that the true significance of this novel protection of the
"privilege of acquiring, owning, and receiving income from outside a state"
is the further protection of personal liberty against social control, and, on
the authority of this decision as a precedent, a possible boundless protection
of personal liberty against social control. In this case social control was
denied the state. In Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States14 and in Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. 15 social control was denied to the federal
government. Any expansion of the social control allowed to the states by these




FRAUD.-The appellee's amended complaint alleged that appellant and three
others, officers of the Marion County Sand and Gravel Company, conspired
to perpetrate a fraud upon the appellee by inducing him to purchase from
two of the defendants, fifty shares of worthless stock of said gravel com-
pany. It further alleged that in consideration of appellee's promise to pay
a note of the company to the appellant then overdue, to cancel an obligation
owed by the company to appellee, and to make another loan to the company,
13Those basic privileges and immunities secured against federal in-
fringement by the first eight amendments have never been held to be protected
from state action by the privileges and immunities clause. See Walker v.
Sauvinet (1875), 92 U. S. 90; Presser v. Illinois (1886), 116 U. S. 252, 6
S. Ct. 580; O'Neill v. Vermont (1892), 144 U. S. 323, 12 S. Ct. 693, Maxwell
v. Dow (1900), 176 U. S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448, Twining v. New Jersey (1908),
211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, Hurtado v. California (1884), 110 U. S. 516, 4
S. Ct. 111, West v. Louisiana (1904), 194 U. S. 258, 24 S. Ct. 650.
14 (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837.
15 (1935) 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758.
16 For a full discussion of the view see Hugh E. Willis (1936), "Con-
stitutional Law of the United States," at p. 927.
The principal case has probably occasioned less comment in the news-
papers and periodicals because it doesn't concern a three letter governmental
agency. However, its constitutional, social and economic importance should
merit quite as much consideration.
